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Abstract.  
This paper explores the impact of government support in Mexico on the 
likelihood of firms achieving functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading in global 
value chains (GVC). Employing a unique dataset, regression analysis was 
undertaken to estimate the predicted probabilities of firms upgrading in GVCs 
considering their regional location. The results suggest that firms located in 
Mexico City are more likely to achieve functional upgrading vis-à-vis northern 
firms. Additionally, the presence of an R&D laboratory is crucial if firms are to 
engage in upgrading. There was no evidence that government support affects 
the likelihood of firms achieving functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2011) 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 
GURRÍA, 2012) are increasingly debating the topics of innovation and ways to 
upgrade Global Value Chains (GVCs) in the context of developing countries. 
However, these institutions have not developed methods that accurately 
evaluate the impact of government innovation interventions (policy instruments) 
with particular focus on their effectiveness in helping firms to upgrade in GVCs. 
This may reflect the fact that the literature on innovation policy evaluation 
(TODD and WOLPIN, 2010) has fallen short in considering the impact of 
government innovation interventions on the likelihood of firms achieving 
functional or inter-sectoral upgrading, and the extent to which this varies by 
region. Assessing the performance and impact of these policy instruments is 
important for maintaining accountability (LENIHAN, 2011) and to enable 
policymakers to ensure that future interventions are appropriate, effective, and 
efficient (NIOSI, 2010).  
 
This paper suggests that the optimum policy design needs to take the regional 
context into account. Yet the concept of a region is ambiguous. Given the 
globalisation process, the concept of a region relates to a vague notion in which 
a region is a fraction of the whole (MORENO-PEREZ, 2008). The objective of 
this paper is to empirically investigate the factors that impact upon the likelihood 
of firms achieving functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading, explicitly 
incorporating government support for business innovation 1  and testing for 
regional differences when firms upgrade in GVCs.  
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The results suggest that regional context significantly affects the likelihood of 
firms to upgrade in GVCs, with firms located in Mexico City more likely to 
upgrade vis-à-vis firms located in the north of the country. Another significant 
factor to upgrade is the presence of an R&D laboratory. Surprisingly, there is no 
evidence that government support makes a difference when upgrading in 
GVCs. This paper makes both theoretical and policy based contributions. 
Thorough research indicates this is the first time that: 1) the likelihood to 
upgrade in GVCs is estimated by means of econometric analysis, providing 
insights to the policy making community to better design future instruments; 
and 2) regional heterogeneity to upgrade in GVCs in Mexico has been tested, 
proving that region matters. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the literature 
on GVCs with a particular focus on the importance of firms upgrading in 
developing countries, the impact of regional location, and government 
intervention. Additionally, this section sets out the hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 3 presents methods and data issues. Section 4 includes the estimation 
results from the econometric analysis with a view to identifying causal 
relationships posed in the hypotheses. Findings, policy implications, and study 
limitations are presented in section 5. The results provide evidence supporting 
the development of theory in the areas of GVCs, innovation, and regional 
studies. Policy design should consider that a range of factors may affect the 
scale of innovation activities in different regions. Conclusions and avenues for 
future research are presented in section 6.   
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2. UPGRADING IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS, REGIONAL LOCATION AND 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
The literatures on GVCs, the role of regions in terms of economic performance, 
and on the rationale for government intervention are invoked.   
 
Global Value Chains   
 
According to PIETROBELLI and RABELLOTTI (2006), a firm’s environment is 
shaped by first,  the collective efficiency of the cluster in which the firm operates, 
second, the pattern of governance of the value chain, and third, the sectoral 
dimension related to peculiar joint features that characterise learning and 
upgrading patterns. Building on HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ’s (2000) 
contribution, PIETROBELLI and RABELLOTTI (2006) recognised four types of 
upgrading for firms: process, product, functional, and inter-sectoral. The third 
and fourth types of upgrading, have particular importance in terms of improving 
a firm’s position within GVCs. Functional upgrading is the acquisition of new, 
superior functions in the value chain (such as design or marketing) or the 
abandonment of lower-value-added functions so that the firm can focus on 
higher-value-added activities. Inter-sectoral upgrading, on the other hand, 
involves the application of competence acquired in a particular function to move 
into a new sector, often in superior products or services. 
 
Regional Location 
 
There is an increasing literature that tests regional differences when analysing 
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upgrading in GVCs (e.g. PAVLÍNEK and ŽENKA, 2010), however to date such 
studies have not concerned themselves with the Mexican case. Given the 
‘maquila’2 phenomenon, it is important to bear in mind that firms located in the 
north 3  of the country are more likely to be embedded in GVCs with a 
hierarchical and quasi-hierarchical governance pattern vis-à-vis firms located 
in the centre and south, where GVCs are more likely to exhibit a network or 
market governance pattern. If this is the case, then it would be reasonable to 
expect that businesses located in the northern region are less likely to achieve 
functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading vis-à-vis central and southern firms, 
as predicted by HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ (2002). These central and 
southern firms would be more likely to achieve these type of upgrading given 
their ease of access to alternative markets (outside of the US and Canada), 
such as the national market and the rest of Latin America. Having said this, it is 
reasonable to expect that some variables affecting the likelihood of firms 
upgrading in GVCs (which will be explained in subsequent sections) may have 
different effects in different regions of the country.  
 
This study incorporates a spatial dimension regarding the study of GVCs as 
suggested by FOLD (2014). In this vein, Mexico has very high inter-regional 
disparities in income levels and productivity. For instance, CHAVEZ and 
FONSECA (2012) found differences in the level of technological development, 
measured in terms of structural efficiency, between the northern and central 
regions as compared to the south that partially explains the labour productivity 
gap among regions. This can be explained by means of the effects of trade 
liberalisation that Mexico engaged in over the last three decades. Major trade 
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reforms introduced in 1985 and 1994 have had a profound effect on the 
difference of performance in relative employment growth and relative efficiency 
among Mexican regions. CHIQUIAR (2005) provided evidence that Mexico’s 
trade reforms, effected through NAFTA with the US and Canada led to a 
divergent pattern in internal regional economic performance. Measured in 
terms of per capita output levels, northern firms in Mexico outperformed central 
and southern firms. Trade liberalisation has increased ties between northern 
Mexico and the United States, at the same time the ties between northern and 
southern Mexico have weakened. This can be explained by the role of distance 
from the border with the US being an important factor (HANSON, 1998).  
 
Role of Government 
 
Given that the national innovation systems of developing countries are 
underdeveloped, lacking in terms of absorptive capacity, technological 
capabilities, fertile ecology and robust innovation systems vis-à-vis developed 
countries (DUTRÉNIT et al., 2010), policies to support these factors are 
justified. Several evaluations of innovation policies in the Latin American region 
have taken place, such as those of HALL and MAFFIOLI (2008), yielding 
interesting insights regarding impacts of government support for business 
innovation on the standard types of innovation output (i.e. product, process, 
marketing and organisational), in line with the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005). 
However, they fall short in measuring the type of innovation suggested by 
PIETROBELLI and RABELLOTTI (2006) that are crucial for developing 
countries. This paper aims to fill this gap.  
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If prospects for development are a priority in the design of business innovation 
policies, then policy makers in developing countries should be concerned with 
the likelihood that functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading will occur.  
International organisations, such as the UNCTAD and the OECD, are 
increasingly exploring innovation and upgrading in GVCs in the context of 
developing countries. Assuming that policy makers in developing countries 
follow the lead of these international organisations, it becomes important to 
consider the context-specific factors in developing country regions. In Latin 
America, such factors include the low propensity to undertake R&D activities 
in-house (ARCHIBUGI and PIETROBELLI, 2003), the absence of linkages 
between firms and universities and weak local knowledge dissemination 
networks (CIMOLI and KATZ, 2002), and the withdrawal from engineering-
intensive industries that results from specialisation in resource-based sectors 
(HUANG and MIOZZO, 2004).  
 
The central theoretical arguments which shape this research are: first, 
functional and inter-sectoral upgrading in GVCs are the type of innovation 
required by developing countries, as they offer opportunities for firms to 
compete successfully in the global economy. Therefore, it is necessary to 
explore the factors affecting the likelihood of firms upgrading in GVCs. Second, 
differences in regional characteristics and economic performance are important 
when designing policy interventions. Regional features should inform policies, 
such as the availability of a specialised labour market, local inputs, and ease of 
access to markets and market information. Third, given the role of government 
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in promoting innovation, it is paramount to determine the impact of government 
policy in terms of firms upgrading in GVCs. These three central arguments of 
the theoretical underpinnings previously discussed shape the research 
question and the following hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1. The likelihood that a firm will functionally and/or inter-sectorally 
upgrade in GVCs depends on four dimensions: 
1a: Cluster collective efficiency, defined as the competitive advantage 
derived from local external economies and joint action.  
1b: Governance pattern of GVCs, which is the type of coordination 
required to decide what, how, and how much is to be produced in the 
value chain. 
1c: The sector in which the firm operates, which relates to the distinctive 
patterns of learning and innovation by economic sectors. 
1d: The regional location. Firms located in the north region are less likely 
to functionally and/or inter-sectorally upgrade in GVCs as compared to 
firms in the centre and south of Mexico. 
The main expectation is that these variables are statistically significant. (The 
sign expectation for each variable is presented later in Table 1, section 3).  
Hypothesis 2. Government support for business innovation in Mexico in the 
period 2006-09 increases the likelihood that firms will functionally and/or inter-
sectorally upgrade in GVCs.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This paper adopts a quantitative (regression analysis) approach to investigate 
causal relationships related to the likelihood of firms upgrading in GVCs. The 
evaluative framework developed represents current ‘best’ practice, as 
advocated by FRITSCH and STOREY (2014). It is important to bear in mind 
that the qualitative approach carried out by PIETROBELLI and RABELLOTTI 
(2006) was able to show how a firm or group of firms produced perceived 
upgrading within its GVC. Indeed, the comprehensive analysis conducted by 
these authors enabled the operationalisation of the variables for upgrading and 
clustering by formulating questions and scenarios based on the definitions 
identified by them.  
 
The evaluation framework adopted here comprises a cross-sectional analysis 
for the period 2006-094 and employs a 2-step HECKMAN (1979) selection 
model5.   
 
(a) Modelling upgrading in GVCs 
Given the nature of the data collection, an issue looked at in more detail later, 
sampling bias may arise due to self-selection of our ‘treated’ respondents. To 
account for this potential problem, the following 2-step Heckman selection 
model (HECKMAN, 1979) is adopted, as proposed by HART et al. (2008) and 
GREENE (2014).  
 
A biprobit Heckman approach (GREENE, 2014) is used, where a recursive 
model is simultaneously estimated for two equations: selection and structural6 
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(SAVIGNAC, 2008) to measure the likelihood of firms achieving functional 
and/or inter-sectoral upgrading in GVCs. 
 
In the first stage, the so-called selection equation (equation 1), a probit model 
is estimated that calculates the probability that a firm will receive government 
support for business innovation (a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the firm has 
received public support in the period 2006-09 and 0 otherwise). In this analysis 
the same regressors of the structural equation are included, plus the dummy 
political affinity to address the identification problem, which is explained below. 
 
The selection equation:  
 
Pr([𝐹𝑖]|𝑧𝑖) =  Φ(𝜂
∗
𝑖
)       (Equation 1) 
     𝜂∗
𝑖
= 𝑧𝑖Θ + 𝑀𝑠𝑖 
 
The second stage - the estimate of the structural equation (equation 2) – 
focuses on firms that have achieved functional and/or Inter-sectoral upgrading 
in GVCs but controls for possible sample selection bias by incorporating an 
additional explanatory variable, the so-called Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR). 
 
The structural equation: 
Pr([𝐹: 𝐼𝑖]|𝑥𝑖) =  Φ(𝜂𝑖)      (Equation 2) 
        𝜂𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖Λ + 𝑀𝑜𝑖  
 
The dependent variables in the structural equation (equation 2) are 
dichotomous: the value 1 is taken if either functional and/or inter-sectoral 
upgrading is achieved; otherwise 0 (see Table 1). The measurement of these 
dependent variables is based on the self-assessment responses from 
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interviewed managing directors of firms that responded to the survey. The 
independent variable, denoted as xi in equation 2, represents the vector of 15 
explanatory variables (see Table 1).   
 
Relevant variables for evaluating public support for business innovation impact 
in developing countries can be identified using the prevailing evaluation 
literature (O'REGAN et al., 2006). The contributions of GEREFFI (2014) also 
enable a better identification of the relevant variables in the model, reducing the 
number of control variables (Table 1) to determine the likelihood of upgrading 
in GVCs in the Mexican context over the period 2006-09.  
 
These variables are the age of the firm; ownership (indigenous versus foreign-
owned firm); absorptive capacities (R&D employment, relative measure in 
terms of total employment, thus, specifying it as a continuous variable); 
technological capabilities (R&D laboratory and formal R&D department); firm 
size; firm structure; whether or not the firm exports; sector; governance pattern 
in GVCs; external economies of clustering7 ; R&D linkages8 ; level of annual 
R&D investment9 (relative measure in terms of total turnover), and region where 
the firm is located. In equation 2, vector xi includes a binary variable 
representing government support for business innovation – it takes the value 1 
if a firm received support and 0 otherwise.  
 
The vector zi in equation 1 includes same variables, except government support 
for business innovation, which is considered the dependent variable. The 
identification problem is addressed by including ‘political affinity’ as an 
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instrumental variable (NIETO, 2011). This is a binary variable taking the value 
of 1 if the political party in power of local government (where the firm operates) 
is the same political party in power of the federal government (who actually 
allocates the government support for business innovation). It takes the value of 
0 otherwise. This variable is used as proxy for ’political clientelism’, which is 
defined as “the distribution of resources by politicians in exchange for support” 
(MONTERO, 2010, p.116). This variable is expected to affect the probability of 
receiving government support for business innovation and not necessarily 
affect innovative output. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
(b)  Data and characteristics of the sample 
A unique data set comprising business performance and innovation measures 
during the period 2006 to 2009 for 477 firms in Mexico was collected. Although 
the aim was to achieve a randomly defined sample, programme-selection bias 
was latent; however, the 2-step Heckman selection model detailed in section 4 
is designed to address this problem. The sample was extracted from the 
Mexican National Register of Scientific and Technological Institutes and 
Enterprises, known as RENIECYT (CONACYT, 2011), and the Mexican 
Entrepreneurial Information System (SIEM, 2015). RENIECYT (SIICYT, 2011)10 
comprises all firms and entities that have applied on at least one occasion for 
public financial support for business innovation. It includes recipients 
(successful applicants) of government support 11  as well as non-recipients 
(unsuccessful applicants) with similar characteristics. From the sample, 164 
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firms are recipients (successful applicants during 2006-09). To achieve the most 
accurate insights regarding the effect of government support, two control 
groups (non-recipients) were constructed: the first comprised 157 unsuccessful 
applicants 12  for support during 2006-09; the second comprised 156 non-
applicants identified from the official record for businesses in Mexico (SIEM), 
which comprises all firms operating in Mexico13. Random sampling selection 
was performed to gather data on R&D and innovation activities and impacts of 
interest through the survey. The second control group (non-applicants) was 
carefully built to match the characteristics of recipients in terms of location, 
sector, and firm size. 
 
A telephone survey was performed, with an overall response rate of 20 per cent: 
from the 2,385 firms contacted, 477 agreed to be interviewed. During data 
collection, more than 80 per cent of respondents could not provide details on 
the specific type of government support for business innovation they had 
received. As a result, a general/aggregate measure for business innovation 
policy instruments (i.e., government support) was used, and therefore the 
various instrument types could not be distinguished, which is a limitation of the 
current study. 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The dual control group approach addresses the difference in effects between 
innovation willing firms (recipients-control group 1) vs. innovation non-willing 
firms (recipients vs. control group 2), and it is in line with SAVIGNAC’s (2008) 
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approach to address potential problems of endogeneity of obstacles and 
propensity to innovate.   
 
(a) Dual control group analysis 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of recipients and non-recipients by 
functional upgrading, inter-sectoral upgrading, and the critical variables used in 
the regressions presented in tables 4 and 5. Although there are no statistical 
differences between the two types of upgrading, it is noteworthy that recipients 
show an average functional upgrading of 68 per cent in the period 2006-09, 
while the mean for unsuccessful applicants (control group 1) is 64 per cent in 
the same period. Nevertheless, non-applicants (control group 2) show an 
average (66%) higher than that of unsuccessful applicants. Interestingly, in 
terms of inter-sectoral upgrading, the results are mixed. When comparing 
recipients and control group 1 (unsuccessful applicants), more recipients (42%) 
seem to achieve this type of upgrading than do unsuccessful applicants (35%). 
However, when comparing recipients and the second control group (non-
applicants), it seems that more non-applicants (48%) achieve inter-sectoral 
upgrading than do recipients (42%). There is no statistical difference among the 
three groups with regards to the two types of upgrading. The only statistical 
difference can be observed between the two control groups in terms of inter-
sectoral upgrading. It is interesting to observe that for all groups, functional 
upgrading is more frequent (64–68%) than inter-sectoral upgrading (35–48%). 
 
[Table 2 here] 
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As evidenced in Table 2, statistical differences between recipients and both 
control groups can be observed in terms of 9 variables. These variables are 
R&D employment, R&D laboratory, R&D department, size, structure, exporter, 
external economies of clustering regarding ease of information and markets, 
R&D linkages, and R&D investment. Of particular interest vis-à-vis hypothesis 
1 is the fact that control group 1 is statistically different from control group 2 in 
terms of inter-sectoral upgrading and R&D department. Specifically, 40 per cent 
of unsuccessful applicants have an R&D department, while only 28 per cent of 
non-applicants have this kind of facility. Table 3 exhibits the regional differences 
identified from the survey data. When conducting significance tests, these 
regional differences are noticeable in terms of functional upgrading, inter-
sectoral upgrading, R&D laboratory, R&D department, exporter, governance 
pattern in GVC, external economies of clustering with specialised labour market 
availability and ease of information and markets; and R&D linkages. The results 
suggest that firms located in Mexico City differ to firms located in the north with 
respect of functional upgrading, inter-sectoral upgrading, R&D laboratory or 
R&D department. It seems that firms located in the north tend to operate in 
GVCs with hierarchical and/or quasi-hierarchical governance patterns vis-à-vis 
firms located in the rest of the country. The latter appear to operate mainly in 
GVCs with market or networking governance patterns. In general terms, firms 
located in the south exhibit weak performance in terms of having R&D 
laboratories or R&D departments; exporting; external economies of clustering 
in terms of specialised labour market availability, and ease of information and 
markets; and, R&D linkages vis-à-vis firms located elsewhere in the country. 
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Clear regional differences arise with the south region lagging in terms of 
economic and innovation activities.   
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
To address the potential problem of selection bias, the 2-step Heckman model 
identified in equations 1 and 2 was performed (on two occasions). The first 
estimation applies to recipients (successful applicants) and control group 1 
(unsuccessful applicants). The second estimation applies to recipients and 
control group 2 (non-applicants). Considering each control group separately, 
Table 4 presents the results of the biprobit model. Heteroskedasticity and 
collinearity have been tested. The results suggest that multicollinearity is not an 
issue in this model. However, heteroskedasticity is present, so robust standard 
error estimation is employed. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The estimation results of the selection equation, in the various specifications 
(columns 3, 7, 11, and 15 of Table 4) found eight statistically significant 
variables. These are ownership, R&D employment, R&D department, size, 
exporter, R&D linkages, R&D investment, and the control variable political 
affinity. In line with the results presented in Table 4, the average marginal effects 
of the biprobit models, with sample selection, are estimated, explaining the 
factors correlated to the propensity to achieve functional upgrading and inter-
sectoral upgrading (see Table 5).  
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[Table 5 here] 
 
(b) Investigating upgrading in GVCs 
Table 5 presents the average marginal effects regarding the probability of a 
recipient achieving functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading compared to each 
control group of non-recipients. The results suggest that region (Mexico city vs. 
North, column 1, 3 and 5), and its combined effect14 with the presence of a R&D 
laboratory (column 1 and 5) and clustering (column 5) affect the likelihood to 
upgrade in GVCs. In this regard, hypothesis 1d cannot be rejected. In terms of 
government support, the results suggest that it does not affect the likelihood of 
firms upgrading functionally or inter-sectorally in GVCs. Despite being included 
in the structural model, the selection term does not affect the outcome. This 
result disproves the second hypothesis. 
 
The estimation of the structural model with recipients and the first control group 
(unsuccessful applicants) reports five statistically significant variables affecting 
the likelihood of achieving functional upgrading: R&D laboratory, structure, 
sector, governance pattern in GVCs, and region. The average marginal effects 
reported in Table 5 allow for the discussion of the magnitude of the relationship 
identified above. The variable with the highest average impact is region, 
followed by governance pattern in GVCs and R&D laboratory. The combined 
effects (interactive term 1) of region and having or not an R&D laboratory are 
more interesting. They show that if the firm with the R&D department is located 
in Mexico City, its probability to achieve functional upgrading will increase even 
further. In terms of firm structure, a venture business is less likely to functionally 
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upgrade than an independent firm without subsidiaries. A firm operating in the 
specialised services sector is less likely to functionally upgrade than a firm 
operating in traditional manufacturing. A firm operating in a GVC with a market 
governance pattern is more likely to functionally upgrade than a firm in a 
hierarchical GVC.  
 
The results support the argument of HUMPHREY and SCHMITZ (2000) that a 
hierarchical or quasi-hierarchical GVC makes it difficult to progress into the 
design and marketing functions of the chain. In terms of inter-sectoral 
upgrading, the estimation results identify three statistically significant variables 
with the highest average effect: R&D laboratory, R&D investment and region. 
The results suggest that firms located in Mexico City are more likely to achieve 
functional upgrading and/or inter-sectoral upgrading, respectively, vis-à-vis 
unsuccessful applicants located in the north. However, if firms are located in 
other parts of the country, there seems to be no significant effect on the 
likelihood of firms to achieve these types of upgrading. 
 
With respect to recipients and the second control group (non-applicants), the 
second estimation reports six statistically significant explanatory variables 
affecting functional upgrading. These are governance pattern in GVCs –with 
the highest average effect- followed by ownership, R&D laboratory, region, 
sector, and external economies of clustering. The effect of region (i.e., 
recipients located in Mexico City vis-à-vis North) increases when considering 
combined effects (interactive term 1 and 2) with having an R&D department or 
with the presence external economies of clustering. With respect to the 
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estimation of inter-sectoral upgrading including recipients and control group 2 
(non-applicants), six variables were found to be statistically significant: 
business age, R&D employment, R&D department, structure, exporter, and 
external economies of clustering. 
  
In general, the average effect of R&D laboratories is one of the highest factors 
in achieving functional upgrading. This effect increases when combined with 
the effect of region. This supports the argument of RUSH et al. (2014) that 
technological capabilities are key to adapting, improving, and generating new 
technology endogenously. These capabilities increase innovation capacities 
and are essential to economic development. The accumulation of technological 
capacity is at least as important to economic development as capital 
accumulation. Another noteworthy result is that governance pattern in GVCs, 
clustering (external economies) and sector affect the likelihood of firms 
functionally upgrading in GVCs. These results suggest that hypotheses 1a, 1b 
and 1c cannot be rejected. This is linked with Hypothesis 1d: regions are 
heterogeneous when achieving functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading in 
GVCs. 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Following prevailing ‘best’ practice in innovation policy evaluation techniques, 
the use of a biprobit Heckman model as applied in this paper is an appropriate, 
systematic, and rigorous method of estimating the impact of government 
support for business innovation on the likelihood of firms upgrading in GVCs in 
the case of a developing country such as Mexico. The use of two control groups 
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to analyse the impact of such support in Mexico is an innovative feature of this 
paper.  
 
Studies by GIULIANI et al. (2005) and PIETROBELLI and RABELLOTTI (2006) 
relied on Likert scales when undertaking quantitative analysis with respect to 
40 original case studies in Latin America; this was identified by the researchers 
themselves as a limitation of their own work. Responding to these studies, the 
testing of hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c is the first attempt to directly identify causal 
relationships with respect to the likelihood of functional and/or inter-sectoral 
upgrading in GVCs. To extend the approach of these researchers, the 2-step 
Heckman model with logistic regression analysis was used to identify the 
factors that affect the likelihood of firms upgrading functionally and/or inter-
sectorally. The results corroborate the suggestion of PIETROBELLI and 
RABELLOTTI (2006) that the likelihood of firms functionally upgrading is 
simultaneously affected by the governance pattern in value chains and the 
collective efficiency of clusters. In addition, it is shown that inter-sectoral 
upgrading is more difficult to achieve than functional upgrading. The implication 
is that different types of upgrading probability should be prioritised when 
designing policy programs and interventions. In line with the prevailing literature 
on business innovation in developing countries, this paper finds that 
technological capabilities – measured by having an R&D laboratory – are key 
drivers in terms of achieving enduring and solid competitiveness in developing 
countries. 
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By testing the effect of region, the results further corroborate the findings of 
CHAVEZ and FONSECA (2012), who claim that Mexico has strong inter-
regional disparities in income and productivity. Moreover, the results of this 
model suggest that the effect of some variables (i.e. R&D laboratory and 
external economies of clustering) have more or less influence in different 
regions. This can be explained by the differences in regional development 
pathways and territorial embeddedness (FOLD, 2014) between these Mexican 
regions. This study provides evidence by adding another inter-regional 
disparity: the likelihood of firms to achieve functional upgrading in GVCs.  
 
However, even when controlling for selection bias, no evidence was found to 
support hypothesis 2: that government support for business innovation affects 
the likelihood of firms achieving functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading. In 
this particular context (Mexico) and period (2006-09), the results suggest that 
government support did not make any difference in terms of influencing firms 
to achieve the type of upgrading required by developing countries; this is at 
odds with the expectations from studies by PIETROBELLI and RABELLOTTI 
(2006). Given Mexico’s stage of economic development, this paper’s findings 
are surprising; further exploration of these issues in the context of Mexico and 
other developing countries could prove to be insightful.  Possible reasons for 
this result may include institutional factors such as lack of a specific policy 
objective to support firms upgrading in GVCs or poor policy implementation. 
For instance, during this research, no specific policy instrument was found to 
be directly concerned with either functional or inter-sectoral upgrading in GVCs; 
therefore, although there are different instruments, they did not target the 
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characteristics of these types of innovations. In terms of poor policy 
implementation, evidence is provided by ITAM (2008) who evaluated the 
administration of two policy instruments (i.e. R&D subsidies, R&D tax breaks) 
in Mexico over a period of two years. The main findings of the ITAM study 
referred to a lack of financial control in the disbursement of support, coupled 
with a long time lag between the allocation of grants and disbursement (on 
average taking more than 15 months). This created delays to recipient firms in 
starting their innovation projects. In 30 per cent of the cases analysed, 
recipients just dropped out of the program and the innovation projects never 
took place. Although, this is only a small sample of all the instruments of 
government support for business innovation in Mexico, their results suggest the 
existence of some government failure (HAAPANEN et al. 2014).  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper contributes to the theories of the impact of innovation policies in 
developing countries and GVCs and provides new evidence.  An adequate and 
appropriate evaluation framework was developed that allowed the testing of the 
impact of region and government support for business innovation on the 
likelihood of firms’ upgrading in GVCs, in Mexico. This framework makes the 
measurement of the likelihood of firms upgrading in GVCs possible. Moreover, 
this study constructed a unique dataset and employed econometric analysis to 
test the effectiveness of business innovation policies, and stylised facts 
available in previous qualitative empirical analyses. The paper highlights and 
models key factors of particular relevance in evaluating support for business 
innovation in developing countries with particular reference to Mexico. Such 
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factors include technological capabilities and absorptive capacities in the form 
of R&D laboratories and formal R&D departments.  
 
The construction of the database used in this study represents an original 
contribution to knowledge given the nature of the firm-level data obtained. 
Methodologically, this paper makes a novel contribution to the innovation policy 
evaluation literature by using a dual control group analysis to gain a precise 
picture of the extent of the impact of government support for business 
innovation. 
 
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that government support for 
business innovation in this particular context (Mexico) and period (2006-09) did 
not affect the likelihood of firms upgrading in GVCs. The variables identified as 
affecting functional and/or inter-sectoral upgrading can, however, serve as a 
guide to policy makers as they design future innovation policy interventions and 
instruments in the context of developing countries. The results also suggest 
that some variables have different effects in different regions. This indicates 
regional heterogeneity which should be borne in mind when designing a policy 
intervention, as proposed by FRITSCH and STOREY (2014).   
 
Additional and currently unexplored questions arise from the findings of the 
paper and merit future investigation. For example, how do the effects of 
government support for business innovation evolve over time? What is the 
effect of government support for business innovation on other issues, such as 
behavioural additionalities? How might functional and inter-sectoral upgrading 
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affect the performance of firms? What are the effects of product and process 
upgrading on the performance of firms? How do different government 
innovation policy instruments specifically affect the promotion of business 
innovation in developing countries such as Mexico? Related to this issue, are 
some instruments more ‘optimal’ than others, and in what contexts? In line with 
the work of DOLAN and HUMPHREY (2004), it would be interesting to 
investigate the restructuring of GVCs between Mexico and its trade partners as 
a consequence of the global economic crisis, and the effects of changes in 
governance patterns on the likelihood of firms to upgrade. The ideas presented 
in this paper are merely the first step in this type of analysis. However, in spite 
of the nuances highlighted throughout this paper, there is no denying that the 
non-significance of public policy intervention for business innovation is a very 
important result of the current research. It points towards a Mexico specific 
context that justifies more investigation with deeper analysis and is certainly a 
field ripe for future research. 
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Table 1 Variable descriptives 
Variable Description Expected sign 
Dependent   
Type of upgrading in 
global value chains 
1=functional upgrading; 0=otherwise  
1=inter-sectoral upgrading; 0=otherwise  
Explanatory   
Business age 
(reference category: 
<5yrs) 
1=5-9yrs; 0=otherwise (-) 
1=>10yrs; 0=otherwise (-) 
Ownership 1=indigenous; 0=foreign owned (+) 
R&D employmenta 
R&D employees/Total number of employees in 
2009 
(+) 
R&D laboratory 1=have R&D laboratory; 0=otherwise (+) 
R&D department 1=formal R&D department; 0=otherwise (+) 
Size Total number of employees in 2009 in logs (+) 
Structure (reference 
category: independent 
firm) 
1=firm with subsidiaries; 0=otherwise (+) 
1=subsidiary of another firm; 0=otherwise (-) 
1=venture business; 0=otherwise (+) 
Exporter 1=yes; 0=otherwise (+) 
Sector (Reference 
category: Traditional 
Manufacturing) 
1=natural resource based; 0=otherwise (-) 
1=complex products; 0=otherwise (+) 
1=specialised suppliers; 0=otherwise (+) 
Governance pattern in 
GVC (reference 
category: hierarchical) 
1=networking; 0=otherwise (+) 
1=quasi-hierarchical; 0=otherwise (-) 
1=market; 0=otherwise (+) 
External economies 
clustering (reference 
category: no 
availability) 
1=specialised labour market availability; 
0=otherwise 
(+) 
1=local inputs available; 0=otherwise (+) 
1=ease of information and markets; 
0=otherwise 
(+) 
R&D linkages 1=yes; 0=otherwise (+) 
R&D investmentb R&D investment / Total turnover in 2009  (+) 
Government support 1=recipient; 0=otherwise (+) 
Region (reference 
category: north) 
1= Centre (except Mexico city); 0=otherwise (+) 
1= Mexico city; 0=otherwise (+) 
1= South; 0=otherwise (+) 
a This variable has been constructed as a relative measure to enable it to be continuous. In an initial stage when collecting data, 
we faced a trade-off between accuracy of responses and response rate. After administering the survey, the only data available for 
this variable was in ordinal form, with three bins: i) 1-4 employees in R&D; ii) 5-9; and, iii) more than 10 employees dedicated 
to R&D. However, in order to allow it to be continuous it has been constructed as relative measure in terms of total employees of 
the firm.  
 
The same applies for b: R&D investment, which has been constructed as relative measure in terms of total turnover of the firm. 
North region comprises the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Durango, Coahuila, 
Nuevo Leon, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Tamaulipas, and Nayarit. Centre (except Mexico city) region comprises of 
Aguascalientes, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Hidalgo, Colima, Michoacán, Morelos, Tlaxcala, Puebla, and Veracruz. Mexico 
City comprises Distrito Federal and Estado de Mexico. South region: Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan 
and Quintana Roo.  
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Table 2 Summary statistics: recipients (successful applicants) vs. control group 1 (unsuccessful applicants) and control group 2 
(non-applicants) 
 Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. ‘a’ denotes the group of recipients, ‘b’ denotes control group 1, and ‘c’ denotes control group 2. When carrying out significance tests, these 
groups (a, b, and c) are compared.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recipients: 164 
a 
Control Group 1: 157 
b 
Control Group 2: 156 
c 
 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Significance test 
(a) & (b) 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Significance test 
(a) & (c) 
Significance 
test (b) & (c) 
Functional Upgrading 0.687 0.465 0.643 0.482 t= -0.728 0.667 0.516 t=  -0.360 t =   0.3649 
Inter-Sectoral Upgrading 0.423 0.532 0.357 0.596 t=  -0.903 0.489 0.543 t=    1.068 t =   1.748* 
Business age 2.409 0.828 2.274 0.844 t=  -1.442 2.410 0.769 t =   0.0193 t =   1.4937 
Ownership 1.201 0.510 1.217 0.570 t =   0.253 1.212 0.568 t =   0.1707 t =  -0.0781 
R&D employment 0.088 0.505 0.002 0.518 t =  -1.5052* 0.003 0.520 t =  -1.4822* t =   0.0170 
R&D Laboratory 0.552 0.499 0.337 0.475 t =  -3.481*** 0.394 0.490 t =  -2.780*** t =   0.9116 
R&D Department 0.429 0.497 0.408 0.494 t =  -0.3364 0.289 0.455 t =  -2.5825** t =  -1.901* 
Size (Number of employees in 2009 in logs) 4.222 2.093 3.619 1.668 t =  -2.860*** 3.858 1.715 t =  -1.7050* t =   1.2507 
Structure 1.738 1.056 1.490 0.917 t =  -2.2435** 1.619 1.021 t =  -1.0186 t =   1.1727 
Exporter 0.503 0.502 0.400 0.492 t =  -1.8353* 0.455 0.500 t =  -0.8627 t =   0.9596 
Industrial Sector 2.848 1.013 2.955 1.094 t =   0.9156 2.801 1.133 t =  -0.3846 t =  -1.2244 
Governance Pattern in Global Value Chain 1.772 1.034 1.809 1.008 t =   0.3195 1.870 1.052 t =   0.8294 t =   0.5172 
External Economies Clustering: Specialised labour 
market availability 0.522 0.501 0.495 0.503 t =  -0.4157 0.537 0.500 t =   0.2576 t =   0.6264 
External Economies Clustering: Local inputs 
available 0.472 0.501 0.543 0.501 t =   1.0874 0.467 0.501 t =  -0.0779 t =  -1.1241 
External Economies Clustering: Ease of information 
and markets 0.734 0.443 0.628 0.486 t =  -1.7380* 0.617 0.488 t =  -2.1356** t =  -0.1695 
R&D Linkages 0.739 0.440 0.551 0.500 t =  -3.069*** 0.557 0.499 t =  -3.333*** t =   0.0931 
R&D Investment  0.086 0.466 0.003 0.498 t =  -1.5402* 0.002 0.490 t =  -1.579* t =  -0.0268 
Region 2.032 0.816 2.124 0.725 t = -0.243 2.046 0.747 t =  -0.425 t = -0.578 
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Table 3 Summary statistics: Regional differences.  
Note: Significance levels: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. ‘a’ denotes the group of firms located in the North; ‘b’ denotes the group of firms located in Mexico City; ‘c’ denotes the group of firms located 
in the centre, except Mexico City; and ‘d’ denoted the group of firms located in the South. When carrying out significance tests, these groups (a, b, c and d) are compared. 
  
 
  
 
North 
a 
Mexico City 
b 
Centre (excl. Mexico City) 
c 
South 
                       d 
   
Number of firms per region 143 95 119 120    
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Significance 
test (a) & (b) 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Significance 
test (a) & (c) 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Significance 
test (a) & (d) 
Significance 
test (b) & (c) 
Significance 
test (b) & (d) 
Significance 
test (c) & (d) 
Functional Upgrading 0.487 0.455 0.743 0.524 t =  0.957** 0.567 0.584 t =  0.421 0.433 0.582 t = -0.385 t =  -0.925* t =   -0.993* t =  -0.429 
Inter-Sectoral Upgrading 0.333 0.548 0.498 0.596 t =  0.984* 0.475 0.534 t =   0.568 0.320 0.459 t =  -0.432 t =  -0.482 t =   -0.948* t =  -0.484 
Business age 2.524 0.785 2.858 0.854 t =  0.365 2.187 0.698 t =  -0.239 2.758 0.855 t =  0.442 t =  -0.374 t =   -0.437 t =  0.458 
Ownership 1.231 0.511 1.224 0.585 t =   -0.253 1.222 0.586 t =  -0.171 1.115 0.569 t =  -0.253 t =  -0.080 t =  -0.124 t =  -0.089 
R&D employment 0.009 0.551 0.081 0.581 t =  0.505 0.003 0.532 t =  -0.454 0.002 0.489 t =  -0.458 t =  -0.408 t =   -0.170 t =  -0.701 
R&D Laboratory 0.325 0.504 0.612 0.512 t =  1.124** 0.544 0.489 t =  1.102* 0.241 0.457 t =  0.524 t =  -0.825* t =  -0.324 t =  -0.301 
R&D Department 0.404 0.602 0.608 0.794 t = 0.364* 0.391 0.525 t =  -0.520 0.308 0.594 t =  -0.364 t =  -0.301 t =  -0.920** t =  -0.251 
Size (Number of employees in 2009 
in logs) 
3.485 1.385 3.825 1.498 t =  0.604 3.658 1.515 t =  0.405 2.921 1.464 t =  -0.660 t =  -0.357 t =  -1.102 t =   -1.257 
Structure 1.521 1.166 1.328 0.958 t =  -0.359 1.648 1.142 t =  -0.568 1.522 0.954 t =  -0.413 t =   0.371 t =   0.424 t =   0.302 
Exporter 0.631 0.428 0.490 0.592 t =  -0.533 0.413 0.607 t =  -0.842 0.400 0.592 t =  -1.837* t =   0.545 t =  0.596 t =  0.458 
Industrial Sector 2.844 1.012 2.957 1.091 t =   0.516 2.811 1.134 t =  -0.385 2.956 1.093 t =   0.516 t =  -0.423 t =  -0.443 t =  -0.423 
Governance Pattern in Global Value 
Chain 
2.902 1.134 1.929 0.988 t =  -1.315** 1.871 1.153 t =   0.941* 1.819 1.214 t =  -0.951* t =  -0.512 t =  -0.417 t =  -0.412 
External Economies Clustering: 
Specialised labour market availability 
0.494 0.668 0.598 0.618 t =  0.970** 0.538 0.612 t =   0.371 0.395 0.713 t =  -0.415 t =  -0.424 t =  -0.824* t =  -0.346 
External Economies Clustering: Local 
inputs available 
0.456 0.527 0.545 0.602 t =  0.445 0.468 0.552 t =  0.479 0.543 0.618 t =   0.524 t =  -0.523 t =  -0.124 t =  0.418 
External Economies Clustering: Ease 
of information and markets 
0.734 0.743 0.628 0.686 t =  -0.538 0.617 0.688 t =  -0.139 0.528 0.686 t =  -1.638* t =  -0.325 t =  -1.169* t =  -0.958* 
R&D Linkages 0.539 0.641 0.591 0.603 t =  0.475 0.518 0.679 t =  -0.433 0.351 0.612 t =  -0.897* t =  -0.398 t =  -0.931* t =  -0.954* 
R&D Investment  0.030 0.666 0.025 0.698 t =  -0.542 0.022 0.590 t =  -0.579 0.021 0.688 t =  -0.543 t =  -0.368 t =  -0.468 t =  -0.382 
Government support for Business 
Innovation 
0.502 0.612 0.495 0.617 t =  -0.415 0.537 0.614 t =   0.576 0.491 0.603 t =  -0.417 t =  0.464 t =  -0.348 t =  -0.482 
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Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values Coeff. t-values
Ownership 0.128 0.382 0.577* 0.318 0.233 0.425 0.507* 0.427 0.465* 1.251 0.423* 0.812 0.286 0.489 0.507* 0.427
R&D employment 0.327 0.257 0.511* 0.282 0.304 0.492 0.491* 0.341 0.267 0.342 0.498* 0.621 0.293* 0.593 0.491* 0.341
R&D Laboratory 1.721** 0.702 0.588** 0.201 1.651* 0.692 0.429** 0.345 1.928*** 0.882 0.326** 0.352 0.307 0.378 0.429** 0.345
R&D Department 0.753* 0.657 0.389 0.492
Size (Number of employees in 2009 in logs) 0.322 0.472 	0.127* 0.075 0.632 0.782 	0.271* 0.111 0.283 0.387 	0.301* 0.132 0.283 0.423 	0.271* 0.111
Structure (1: Subsidiary of other firm; 0:Independent firm) 	 -0.412** -0.329 0.392 0.477
Structure (1: Venture business; 0:Independent firm) -0.432* -0.221 -0.256 -0.473
Exporter (1=yes; 0=otherwise) 0.538 0.622 -0.278* -0.226 0.432 0.558 -0.125* -0.432 0.328 0.246 -0.012* -0.361 0.542** 0.697 -0.125* -0.432
Sector (1: Complex Products; 0: Traditional Manufacturing) 	 0.811* 0.634 0.288 0.467
Sector (1: Specialised suppliers; 0: Traditional Manufacturing) -0.504** -0.153 0.543 0.672
Governance Pattern in Global Value Chain (1; Market; 0: Hierarchical) 1.473** 1.931 0.282 0.538 1.683** 1.305 0.891 0.598
Clustering: Specialised labour market availability 	 0.640** 0.782 0.934 0.926
Clustering: Local inputs available 0.612* 0.478 0.118 0.381
R&D Linkages 0.215 0.367 0.411* 0.216 0.239 0.341 0.382* 0.314 0.312 0.485 0.527* 0.161 0.317 0.379 0.382* 0.314
R&D Investment 0.189 0.378 0.423* 0.22 0.721** 0.693 0.399* 0.298 0.513 0.472 0.502* 0.353 0.529 0.412 0.399* 0.298
Government support for Business Innovation 0.345 0.984 --- --- 0.276 1.237 --- --- 0.654 1.112 --- --- 0.979 1.362 --- ---
Region (1: Centre except Mexico city, 0: North) 0.789 0.835 0.432 0.563 0.623 0.892 0.485 0.523 0.558 0.694 0.423 0.501 0.472 0.491 0.511 0.532
Region (1: Mexico City; 0: North) 0.722* 1.764 0.392 0.461 0.230* 0.584 0.384 0.481 0.932* 2.168 0.412 0.472 0.867 0.921 0.734 0.743
Region (1: South, 0: North) 0.429 0.877 0.418 0.486 0.374 0.683 0.398 0.538 0.419 0.534 0.398 0.533 0.369 0.721 0.402 0.512
Region (Mx city) x R&D Laboratory 0.589* 0.321 0.323 0.426 0.325 0.493 0.482 0.488 0.523* 2.034 0.425 0.455 0.406 0.422 0.357 0.428
Region (Mx city) x Clustering (Spec labour mkt availability) 0.375 0.421 0.321 0.438 0.311 0.978 0.277 0.426 0.492* 1.365 0.298 0.435 0.348 0.783 0.395 0.497
Political Affinity --- --- 0.103* 0.101 --- --- 0.098* 0.198 --- --- 0.103* 0.101 --- --- 0.098* 0.198
N. Obs. 321 321 320 320
Censored Obs. 113 113 82 82
Uncensored Obs. 208 208 238 238
Wald test (p-values) 0.423 0.624 0.327 0.589
Blank	fields	denote	variables	that	have	been	dropped	when	estimating	models	due	to	its	non-significance	in	initial	estimations.
Dep.	Var.	(Gov	Supp.)
Structural	Eq. Selection	Eq.
Dep.	Var.	(Intersectoral	
Upgrading)
Dep.	Var.	(Gov	Supp.)
Table 4: Biprobit model, with sample selection, explaining the factors correlated to the propensity to achieve Functional Upgrading (FU) or Intersectoral Upgrading (ISU) considering interaction 
***Significant	at	1%;	**Significant	at	5%;	*Significant	at	10%;	standard	errors	are	robust.
Structural	Eq.
Dep.	Var.	(Functional	
Upgrading)
Selection	Eq.
Dep.	Var.	(Gov	Supp.)
Recipients vs. Control Group 1 Recipients vs. Control Group 2
Structural	Eq. Selection	Eq. Structural	Eq. Selection	Eq.
Dep.	Var.	(Functional	
Upgrading)
Dep.	Var.	(Gov	Supp.)
Dep.	Var.	(Intersectoral	
Upgrading)
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dy/dx t-values dy/dx t-values dy/dx t-values dy/dx t-values
Business age 0.008** 0.895
Ownership 0.149* 1.251
R&D employment 0.079* 0.593
R&D Laboratory 0.126** 0.702 0.019* 0.692 0.117*** 0.782
R&D Department 0.025* 0.657
Size (Number of employees in 2009 in logs) 	
Structure (1: Subsidiary of other firm; 0:Independent firm) -0.016** -0.329
Structure (1: Venture business; 0:Independent firm) -0.042* -0.221
Exporter (1=yes; 0=otherwise) 0.115* 0.697
Sector (1: Complex Products; 0: Traditional Manufacturing) 0.024 0.732 0.021 0.783 0.020* 0.634 0.021 0.732
Sector (1: Specialised suppliers; 0: Traditional Manufacturing) -0.084** -0.153 -0.044 -0.423 -0.046 -0.367 -0.039 -0.389
Governance Pattern in Global Value Chain (1; Market; 0: Hierarchical) 0.131** 1.931 0.183 2.532 0.207** 1.305 0.118 2.102
Clustering: Specialised labour market availability 0.011 0.827 0.009 0.731 0.011** 0.782 0.011 0.673
Clustering: Local inputs available 0.002 0.524 0.005 0.473 0.003 0.589 0.004* 0.478
R&D Investment (1=yes; 0=otherwise) 0.021** 0.693
Government support for Business Innovation (1=yes; 0=otherwise) 0.013 0.984 0.017 1.237 0.025 1.112 0.018 1.362
Region (1: Centre except Mexico city, 0: North) 0.012 0.835 0.006 0.892 0.008 0.694 0.004 0.491
Region (1: Mexico City; 0: North) 0.179* 1.764 0.043* 0.584 0.024* 2.168 0.017 0.921
Region (1: South, 0: North) 0.032 0.877 0.027 0.683 0.026 0.534 0.021 0.721
Region (Mx city) x R&D Laboratory 0.015* 0.321 0.014 0.493 0.034* 2.034 0.015 0.422
Region (Mx city) x Clustering (Spec labour mkt availability) 0.001 0.421 0.002 0.978 0.012* 1.365 0.011 0.783
Blank	fields	denote	variables	that	have	been	dropped	when	estimating	models	due	to	its	non-significance	in	initial	estimations.
Table	5:	Average	marginal	effects	of	biprobit	models,	with	sample	selection,	explaining	the	factors	correlated	to	the	propensity	to	achieve	Functional	
Upgrading	and	Inter-Sectoral	Upgrading.
Dep.	Var.	(Intersectoral	
Uprading)
Recipients	vs.	Control	Group	2
***Significant	at	1%;	**Significant	at	5%;	*Significant	at	10%;	standard	errors	are	robust.
Dep.	Var.	(Functional	
Uprading)
Dep.	Var.	(Intersectoral	
Uprading)
Dep.	Var.	(Functional	
Uprading)
Recipients	vs.	Control	Group	1
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Endnotes 
 
1 Government support for business innovation is defined in this paper as any type of policy instrument 
used by policymakers to increase business innovation activity in Mexico during 2006-09. During the 
period under investigation (i.e., 2006-09), the Mexican government granted supports for innovation to 
firms using a variety of instruments. R&D tax breaks and subsidies were the main instruments; while 
other instruments included strategic alliances, innovation networks for competitiveness, operation of 
technology transfer offices, as well as acquisition of intellectual property rights (CONACYT, 2011).  
2 Defined as factories or assembly plants operated and usually located in the north of Mexico under 
preferential tariff programmes. 
3 North region comprises the states of Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Chihuahua, 
Sinaloa, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, Tamaulipas, and Nayarit. Centre 
region (except Mexico City) comprises of Aguascalientes, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Hidalgo, 
Colima, Michoacán, Morelos, Tlaxcala, Puebla, and Veracruz. Mexico City region comprises Distrito 
Federal and Estado de Mexico. South region: Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan 
and Quintana Roo. 
4 There is a potential problem in the estimation of the timing of innovation output vis-à-vis the timing 
of business innovation policy implementation.  Firms were asked if they received government support 
for business innovation during the period 2006-2009, without specifying precisely when they received 
it; then they were asked if they achieved upgrading in GVC during the period.  This analysis was taken 
within the constraints of an evaluation using cross-sectional survey data; a number of specific issues 
arise.  First, the nature of the government support for business innovation allows firms to draw down 
the monies offered over a 3-year period, which means that a business receiving an offer at the end of 
2009 will perhaps not have fully realised the benefits of assistance; therefore, the model may under-
estimate the effects of assistance.  Second, assistance received at the start of the period (i.e., 2006) may 
already have had its effect on the firm or plant; to model firm performance in a period far removed 
from the point of assistance may be problematic and lead to an over-estimate of the effects of 
assistance.  Third, there is an assumption that the actual realisation of the effects of government support 
received by firms in 2006-09 will be fully captured by the model.  This may not be the case and again 
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may under-estimate the effects of government support for business innovation.  However, whilst 
bearing in mind these limitations and caveats, it is important to highlight the indicative nature of the 
results and findings which yield insights from an academic and policy making perspective. 
5 A relatively large sample is used and a bespoke survey designed, which provides a rich and distinct 
variable set for both the selection and upgrading (performance) models. 
6 The authors are grateful for two anonymous reviewers’ comments which allowed them to improve the 
model with a more concise specification, by means of identifying relevant variables and using a more 
appropriate functional form of the model, that is, a bi-probit. This resulted in a more robust estimation. 
7 Whether or not the firm is located in a cluster with an available specialised labour market, available 
local inputs, and/or ease of access to information and markets. 
8 Formal linkages made by the firm in order to collaborate with partners (e.g. universities) in R&D 
activities. Although NADVI (1999) identified three different types of joint action (vertical, bilateral 
horizontal, and multilateral horizontal), respondents to the survey were unable to recognise the type of 
joint action. Therefore, this study measures this variable by whether or not the firm has formal 
collaboration through R&D linkages. 
9 This is a relative measure in terms of total turnover in 2009 in order to construct it as a continuous 
variable. Originally, this measure was binary taking the value 1 if more than MXN$1 million annually, 
0 if less. MXN$: Mexican pesos (cut-offs adopted from the Ibero-American Network for Science and 
Technology Indicators, RICYT 1999).  
10 Until 2009, RENIECYT comprised 3,827 firms. According to SIICYT (2011), this database is 
representative in terms of firm size, sector, and location of a total population of approximately four 
million firms operating in Mexico. 
11 Up until 2009, the Mexican government granted more than 2,000 supports to innovation in the form 
of R&D subsidies, R&D tax breaks, and R&D network alliances (CONACYT, 2011). 
12 The sample comprises applicants for government support for business innovation during 2006-09 
and represents 12.46% of the RENIECYT population. 
13 Constructing the latter group had two aims: first, to compare the group of recipients with firms that 
decided to apply for government support for business innovation but were unsuccessful; and second, to 
reflect the wider business population operating in Mexico that had not applied for government support 
for business innovation. 
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14 Interaction effects regarding size were considered in the original models, and they turn out to be 
statistically non-significant. Therefore, these interaction effects are not included in the final models. 
 
